I. SDTX No. 4:12-cv-592 Candace Louise Curtis vs Amy Brunsting, Anita Brunsting and Does 1-100, a breach of fiduciary action seeking accounting and disclosures filed 2/27/2012. Filed Pro se!
II. 5th Circuit ROA.12-20164 – Curtis v Brunsting 704 F.3d 406 (pro se appeal)
III. Harris County District Court 164 Cause No. 2013-05455, a malpractice action against the estate planning attorneys filed by Carl Brunsting as “Independent Executor” of his Parents estate, filed January 29, 2013. Carl resigned the office of “independent executor” February 19, 2015 and there has been no plaintiff in this case since.
IV. Harris County Probate Court No. 4 Cause No. 412249-401, a civil tort action exclusively related to the Brunsting trust filed on April 9, 2013, the same day as the injunction hearing in SDTX No. 4:12-cv-592.
V. Harris County Probate Court No. 4 Cause No. 412249-402 – the federal case was remanded to Harris County Probate Court No. 4 May 14, 2014. However, the case had never been removed from a probate court and could not be returned to where it had never been.
VI. The “remand order” was accepted in Probate Court No. 4 as a “transfer order” on May 22, 2014; converted into “Estate of Nelva Brunsting No. 412249-402” and then Dissolved into Estate of Nelva Brunsting No. 412249-401, which is the case brought by Carl Brunsting both individually and as “independent” executor on March 9, 2015, five days after the pour-over had been completed and there was no need for further action of any kind in the probate court.
VII. Curtis et al., vs. Kunz-Freed et al., SDTX No. 4:16-cv-1969, an honest services fraud case brought under the racketeer influenced corrupt organization statutes filed July 5, 2016: dismissed for failure to state a claim. I don’t think there will be any problem with stating one now.
VIII. 5th Circuit ROA.17-20360 affirmed for lack of a sufficient statement of supporting facts June 28, 2018.
IX. Registration of Foreign Judgment, Submission ID: 43704956, filed with Harris District Clerk on June 12, 2020, domesticating the federal preliminary injunction. The Foreign Judgment was not challenged by the respondents within 30 days as required and thus, the Foreign Judgment became a final judgement on July 12, 2020.
X. 412249-403 – This is district court case #3 supra, (See Narvaez v Powell) A professional malpractice case is not a probate matter and cannot be made to be ancillary to a probate matter. It helps to notice that “Associate Judge Clarinda Comstock” (county employee/appointee) was represented in Johnson v Dexel by the same attorneys that are representing the estate planning attorneys in Harris County District Court 164 Cause No. 2013-05455. A case ordered transferred to Harris County Probate Court No. 4 on April 4, 2019, without a pending probate administration to be ancillary to and, where it has remained without a plaintiff.
Haight v. Koley Jessen PC, No. 10-18-00057-CV, at *4-5 (Tex. App.
June 12, 2019) (“In In re Hannah, the court held that a cause of action brought in the district court was not a “matter related to a probate proceeding” within the scope of Section 31.002 of the Estates Code. In re Hannah, 431 S.W.3d at 809. The Hannah court focused on the nature of the damages sought, and held that because the suit sought damages which would, if awarded, be satisfied from the defendant’s individual assets rather than from any property of the estate, the claims were not related to a probate proceeding. In re Hannah, 431 S.W.3d at 809-811. In Narvaez, the court agreed with the court in Hannah that the nature of the claims and the relief sought must be examined when determining whether the probate court has jurisdiction of a non-probate claim. Narvaez v. Powell, 564 S.W.3d 49, 56 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2018, no pet). In Narvaez, a group of heirs filed suit in district court against attorneys alleging breach of fiduciary duties and legal malpractice. Narvaez v. Powell, 564 S.W.3d at 52. The court in Narvaez found that a legal malpractice claim cannot be characterized as a probate proceeding within the meaning of Section 31.001 or related to a probate proceeding as that term is defined by Section 31.002 of the Estates Code. Narvaez v. Powell, 564 S.W.3d at 57.”)
The Petition for writ of mandamus in Hannah, filed by attorney Bobbie. G. Bayless, the architect of the Brunsting Frankensuits.
XI. 412249-404 – A statutory Bill of Review constituting a direct attack on the Probate Courts Order denying Candace Curtis Plea to the Jurisdiction It was MADE INTO A SEPARATE CASE BY THE CLERK’s insistence that it get a separate case number. The reason for the manufacture of multiple case numbers is to prevent a cohesive review as the clerk insists that they will only compile a record on appeal from a single case numbered file.
XII. 412249-405 – This case was created March 11, 2022 by an order severing Carl Brunsting from the 412249-401 lawsuit Carl Brunsting filed in the probate court April 9, 2013, [No. 412249-401], leaving Candace Curtis as the sole defendant with alleged Co-Trustee Defendants Amy Brunsting and Anita Brunsting and their attorneys Stephen Mendel and Neal Spielman as the only remaining Plaintiff’s in the lawsuit Carl Brunsting filed the same day as the preliminary injunction hearing in the Southern District of Texas.
XIII. Texas First District Court of Appeal No. 01-22-00378-CV (Appeal
Withdrawn) The clerk will not compile a record from more than one case
number. This would explain why the attorneys create a mess with multiple
case file numbers when there is only one family, one family trust, and one set of facts at issue.
XIV. Texas First District Court of Appeal No. 01-22-00513-cv Petition for Writ of Mandamus (denied with no explanation) Apparently the dirt flows up steam in Texas which is a mirror of the Chalupowski fleecing in Massachusetts.
A December 5, 2021 Rule 11 Agreement agreeing not to “disinherit disabled beneficiary Carl Brunsting but only beneficiary Candace Curtis;
A March 11, 2022 order severing the claims of diversity polluting “Involuntary Plaintiff” Carl Brunsting from those of “Co-Plaintiff” Candace Curtis followed by Co-Plaintiff Carl Brunstings’ March 18, 2022 Nonsuit of Co-Plaintiff Candace Curtis and a February 25, 2022 Order for Summary Judgement, without ever allowing for an evidentiary hearing, and changing Candace Curtis standing from federal plaintiff to sole defendant to counter claims in a court where she never filed claims in the first instance. All these shenanigans uncover the veil of fraudulent joinder and provide the basis for invoking removal jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a) and (b)(1). There hasn’t even been an evidentiary hearing. Candace Curtis could never get an evidentiary hearing. Without evidence no judgment can be entered and certainly no summary judgment can be issued as no issues can be resolved. Oh, but let us not let law get in the way when stealing money is the only issue. This has been a money held hostage for ransom accompanied with and extortion (threat of disinheritance) and insistence on a settlement contract that would have the attorneys stuffing their pockets long before the beneficiaries would see more than peanuts.
XV. SDTX No. 4:22-cv-1129 April 7, 2022 created by removal of the alleged Co-Trustees’ counterclaims to the Southern District of Texas. This non-probate case was returned to the probate court even though the original remand is void on its face because the case had never been in a Texas state court and the federal plaintiff was a defendant in the alleged diversity polluting Co-Plaintiff Carl Brunsting’s faulty probate court tort suit and was later non-suited by alleged co-plaintiff Carl Brunsting.
The Brunsting trust controversy is not a probate matter, a probate case or a probate proceeding and there is no estate administration for all of these fraudulently manufactured cases to have been filed ancillary too.
Elmer Brunsting [412248] and Nelva Brunsting [412249] had pour-over-wills [412249], [412248] and a living trust. Elmer’s estate inventory [412248] doesn’t contain any tangible property other than ½ of a 1970’s used car and Nelva’s estate inventory [412249] also contains ½ of a used car. Nothing else in either inventory could possibly provide a basis for probate jurisdiction and both pour-over estates [412248] and [412249] had been dropped from the active docket.
The questions at that juncture are (1) What “estate administration” were 412,249-401 and 412,249-402 filed ancillary to? (2) “where is the federal plaintiff’s lawsuit?” (3) Who was representing the “estate” when this consolidation agreement was being signed? (3) Under what rule can a remand order be accepted as a transfer order?
FELONY MISAPPLICATION OF FIDUCIARY PROPERTY
Given that I am alleging organized crime affecting interstate and foreign commerce, I should probably begin by including a few relevant Texas State Penal Statutes. Every participant is a principal. You cannot sell state and federal felonies as representing a client in litigation and there is no immunity for larceny. That is especially true where, as here, there is no competent jurisdiction in the Harris County Statutory Probate Court.
Tex. Pen. Code § 7.01 – Parties to Offenses
(a) A person is criminally responsible as a party to an offense if the offense is committed by his own conduct, by the conduct of another for which he is criminally responsible, or by both.(b) Each party to an offense may be charged with commission of the offense.(c) All traditional distinctions between accomplices and principals are abolished by this section, and each party to an offense may be charged and convicted without alleging that he acted as a principal or accomplice.
“(a) A person is criminally responsible for an offense committed by the conduct of another if: (1) acting with the kind of culpability required for the offense, he causes or aids an innocent or nonresponsible person to engage in conduct prohibited by the definition of the offense;(2) acting with intent to promote or assist the commission of the offense, he solicits, encourages, directs, aids, or attempts to aid the other person to commit the offense; or(3) having a legal duty to prevent commission of the offense and acting with intent to promote or assist its commission, he fails to make a reasonable effort to prevent commission of the offense.(b) If, in the attempt to carry out a conspiracy to commit one felony, another felony is committed by one of the conspirators, all conspirators are guilty of the felony actually committed, though having no intent to commit it, if the offense was committed in furtherance of the unlawful purpose and was one that should have been anticipated as a result of the carrying out of the conspiracy.”
“(a) For purposes of this section:(1) “Fiduciary” includes: (A) a trustee, guardian, administrator, executor, conservator, and receiver;(B) an attorney in fact or agent appointed under a durable power of attorney as provided by Subtitle P, Title 2, Estates Code;(C) any other person acting in a fiduciary capacity, but not a commercial bailee unless the commercial bailee is a party in a motor fuel sales agreement with a distributor or supplier, as those terms are defined by Section 162.001, Tax Code; and(D) an officer, manager, employee, or agent carrying on fiduciary functions on behalf of a fiduciary.(2) “Misapply” means deal with property contrary to: (A) an agreement under which the fiduciary holds the property; or(B) a law prescribing the custody or disposition of the property.(b) A person commits an offense if he intentionally, knowingly, or recklessly misapplies property he holds as a fiduciary or property of a financial institution in a manner that involves substantial risk of loss to the owner of the property or to a person for whose benefit the property is held.(c) An offense under this section is:(1) a Class C misdemeanor if the value of the property misapplied is less than $100;(2) a Class B misdemeanor if the value of the property misapplied is $100 or more but less than $750;(3) a Class A misdemeanor if the value of the property misapplied is $750 or more but less than $2,500;(4) a state jail felony if the value of the property misapplied is $2,500 or more but less than $30,000;(5) a felony of the third degree if the value of the property misapplied is $30,000 or more but less than $150,000;(6) a felony of the second degree if the value of the property misapplied is $150,000 or more but less than $300,000; or(7) a felony of the first degree if the value of the property misapplied is $300,000 or more.(d) An offense described for purposes of punishment by Subsections (c)(1)-(6) is increased to the next higher category of offense if it is shown on the trial of the offense that the offense was committed against an elderly individual as defined by Section 22.04.(e) With the consent of the appropriate local county or district attorney, the attorney general has concurrent jurisdiction with that consenting local prosecutor to prosecute an offense under this section that involves the state Medicaid program.”
I also suggest looking at Texas Penal Code Section 32.46 – Fraudulent Securing of Document Execution, Texas Penal Code Section 32.47 – Fraudulent Destruction, Removal, or Concealment of Writing, Texas Penal Code Section 32.48 – Simulating Legal Process, and Texas Penal Code 32.53 – Exploitation of Child, Elderly Individual, or Disabled Individual
The Nature of the Claims and the Relief Sought
Impunity